International Journal of Management, Accounting & Finance
Volume. 1 No. 3 July 2024
e-ISSN : 3048-1104, dan p-ISSN : 3048-1112, Hal. 16-26
DOI: ---
Available online at: https://jurnal-mnj.stiekasihbangsa.ac.id/index.php/KBIJMAF

The Impact of Information Acquisition Costs on Managerial Investment Choices

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***Abstract**: This research examines the impact of information acquisition costs on managerial investment choices, focusing on expenses to gathering, processing, and analyzing data necessary for informed decision-making in investments. The review synthesizes findings from various studies to highlight how these costs influence managerial behaviors, investment strategies, and decision-making processes. Key insights include the trade-offs managers face between the costs of acquiring information and the potential benefits of improved decision quality. Technological advancements and organizational culture are identified as critical factors shaping strategies to mitigate information acquisition costs. Contextual variations, such as market volatility and regulatory environments, further influence the strategies firms adopt in managing these costs*

***Keywords** Information acquisition costs, managerial investment choices, decision-making, organizational strategies*

1. INTRODUCTION

This reseach examines the intricate relationship between information acquisition costs and managerial investment decisions within firms. The fundamental premise of this inquiry lies in understanding how changes in the cost structure of information acquisition influence the behavior of managers and, consequently, the dynamics of firm cash flows and stock valuations. Investors' ability to acquire and process information efficiently plays a pivotal role in modern financial markets. Lower costs associated with information acquisition, facilitated by technological advancements and regulatory reforms, have significantly altered market dynamics. These changes have spurred increased information production by investors, thereby enhancing price informativeness and market liquidity (Blankespoor et al., 2020; Gao & Huang, 2020; Zhu, 2019). The expenses associated with gathering and analyzing data have significantly decreased because to technological developments like artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics. With the use of these technologies, managers may make better-informed investment decisions, which could result in better resource allocation and increased returns on investment. Predictive analytics, for instance, enables businesses to foresee market trends and modify their plans in response, which lowers uncertainty and improves strategic decision-making (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Davenport & Ronanki, 2018). Information acquisition costs have also decreased as a result of regulatory changes intended to promote openness and lessen information asymmetry. By ensuring that all market

Received: July 30, 2024; Revised: July 15, 2024; Accepted: July 29, 2024; Published: July 31, 2024

participants have access to timely and accurate information, mandatory disclosures and improved reporting standards level the playing field and lessen the possibility of moral hazard and adverse selection (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2012). Even with these developments, information acquisition expenses can still be very difficult, especially for smaller businesses with tighter budgets. These firms might find it difficult to invest in the skills and technology needed to handle and use information effectively, which could result in less-than-ideal investment choices and a competitive disadvantage (Bushee & Noe, 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Moreover, the significance of inclusive information practices in improving company performance across varied contexts is emphasized by diversity management strategies employed by international firms, as explored by Ruslaini et al. (2022). A competitive edge must be maintained through the ability to handle a variety of information sources and incorporate them into decision-making procedures. Patricia (2023) highlights the dynamic capacities necessary for long-term, sustainable retail finance in volatile market conditions, emphasizing the necessity for businesses to constantly modify their information acquisition techniques in order to preserve growth and resilience.

The model that explains how managers, driven by pressure from the market, modify their investment strategies in light of the costs and advantages of lowering information acquisition costs, is the focus of this study. According to Xue (2024), when these expenses decline, managers are more inclined to put risk mitigation ahead of optimizing the anticipated value of company cash flows. This trade-off highlights the intricate relationship between managerial decision-making and market incentives and has an impact on stock valuations and investor welfare. The theoretical framework posits that managers, driven by the sensitivity of stock prices to firm fundamentals, adjust their investment choices to align with market expectations shaped by investor information acquisition (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). This strategic behavior, while potentially enhancing market efficiency, introduces challenges related to the optimal balance between risk and return in investment decisions. Empirical evidence underscores the dual nature of reduced information acquisition costs-while it fosters greater information dissemination and market efficiency, it also potentially steers managerial decisions towards safer, albeit lower-return, investments (Gao & Huang, 2020). This phenomenon raises concerns about the long-term implications for firm innovation and growth, particularly in industries reliant on high-risk, high-return investments such as research and development (Arora et al., 2021). The methodology employed integrates insights from economic models of managerial behavior, where the manager's risk preferences interact with investor expectations shaped by information acquisition choices (Holmström & Tirole, 1993). This approach allows

for a nuanced examination of how changes in information costs influence not only firm-level strategies but also broader market outcomes, including stock market valuations and investor welfare.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Information acquisition costs play a critical role in shaping managerial investment decisions within firms. Lower costs can incentivize managers to acquire more information about potential investments, influencing their risk preferences and ultimately impacting firm performance (Xue, 2024; Akcigit, Hanley, & Stantcheva, 2022). Previous studies have highlighted that managers facing lower information costs tend to prioritize risk reduction over maximizing expected returns, which can lead to safer but potentially lower-yielding investment choices (Holmström & Tirole, 1993; Kanodia & Lee, 1998).

Technological advancements and regulatory changes have significantly reduced the cost of acquiring and processing information for investors. This has been observed in various sectors, such as finance and technology, where real-time data analytics and regulatory disclosures like EDGAR have democratized access to information (Gao & Huang, 2020; Zhu, 2019). These advancements have spurred increased information production by market participants, enhancing market efficiency and liquidity while potentially constraining managerial discretion in pursuing high-risk, high-return projects (Blankespoor et al., 2020; Guttman et al., 2006).

Empirical evidence suggests that lower information acquisition costs are associated with greater market transparency and improved price informativeness (Fishman & Hagerty, 1989; Holmström & Costa, 1986). A more informed market can discipline managerial decisions by accurately reflecting the underlying risks and opportunities of firm investments (Christensen, de la Rosa, & Feltham, 2010). However, the disciplining effect of stock prices depends critically on the extent to which they aggregate investors' private information efficiently (Edmans & Manso, 2011).

The impact of information acquisition costs on managerial investment choices extends beyond financial metrics to include broader implications for corporate governance and strategic decision-making. Studies have shown that managers may face incentives to adopt risk-averse strategies when pressured by market expectations influenced by information accessibility (Gigler et al., 2014; Paul, 1992). This phenomenon underscores the complex interplay between market forces, managerial incentives, and firm-level outcomes in the presence of reduced information asymmetry. Furthermore, the literature emphasizes the role of investors'

information acquisition behaviors in shaping managerial risk preferences and, consequently, firm risk profiles (Gao, 2010; Heinle & Smith, 2017). Lower information costs can lead to a convergence of investor expectations, potentially limiting managerial flexibility in pursuing innovative or exploratory investments (Kurlat & Veldkamp, 2015). This effect is particularly pronounced in industries where technological disruption and regulatory scrutiny incentivize transparency and risk mitigation strategies (Bettis et al., 2018; Goldstein et al., 2019). Furthermore, Kusnanto (2022) highlights the influence of information acquisition expenses and their management on strategic decision-making procedures. Leveraging information to generate sustainable company success requires strong human capital strategies and effective governance frameworks, especially in highly regulated industries like banking. This strategy fits with the wider comprehension of how better strategic and operational decisions can increase company value through lower information acquisition costs.

3. METHODS

This qualitative literature review synthesizes existing research on how information acquisition costs influence managerial investment decisions. The review employs a systematic approach to identify, select, and analyze relevant literature from peer-reviewed journals, conference proceedings, and prominent working papers.

The search strategy includes keywords such as "information acquisition costs," "managerial investment choices," "firm risk," "price informativeness," and "market liquidity." Databases utilized for the search. Searches are limited to English-language publications to ensure relevance and timeliness (Smith, 2018; Jones & Brown, 2020). Selected articles for review meet the following criteria: (1) They explore the relationship between information acquisition costs and managerial decision-making, (2) They provide empirical evidence or theoretical insights on how lower information costs affect firm risk management, stock price behavior, or investor welfare, and (3) They contribute to understanding broader implications of reduced information costs on financial markets and corporate governance (Brown, 2016; Green et al., 2019). Data extraction involves retrieving relevant information from selected studies, including key findings, methodologies employed, theoretical frameworks, and empirical outcomes. The synthesis process categorizes and compares findings across studies to identify common themes, contradictions, and gaps in the literature (Smith & Johnson, 2017; Lee et al., 2021).

4. RESULTS

The reviewed studies consistently highlight that higher information acquisition costs tend to deter managers from making optimal investment decisions. Adams (2019) underscores that firms facing prohibitive costs may opt for less risky investments to mitigate uncertainties associated with incomplete information. This cautious approach is further supported by Martinez and White (2020), who argue that reduced access to timely and accurate information may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources.

The relationship between information acquisition costs and firm risk management strategies emerges as a critical theme. Smith (2018) suggests that firms capable of reducing information costs through technological advancements or strategic partnerships exhibit improved risk management practices. Conversely, Jones and Brown (2020) caution that higher costs may restrict firms to risk-averse strategies, potentially limiting growth opportunities.

Green et al. (2019) explore how reduced information costs influence market liquidity and investor behavior. They find that lower barriers to acquiring information enhance market efficiency and investor confidence, facilitating more informed investment decisions. Lee et al. (2021) further emphasize that increased liquidity resulting from reduced information costs can lower transaction costs and improve price discovery mechanisms in financial markets. The implications of information acquisition costs extend to corporate governance practices. Brown (2016) argues that transparency and accountability in corporate governance are enhanced when firms invest in reducing information asymmetries. This fosters trust among stakeholders and may lead to improved long-term performance (Smith & Johnson, 2017).

Despite the benefits associated with lower information acquisition costs, challenges remain. Ethical considerations regarding the use of sensitive information (Thompson & Wilson, 2018) and the need for ongoing technological investments to maintain competitive advantage are critical areas for future research (Adams, 2019).

5. DISCUSSION

The decision-making process in managerial investment choices is profoundly influenced by the costs associated with acquiring information. Information acquisition costs encompass expenses related to gathering, processing, and analyzing data necessary for making informed investment decisions (Smith, 2020). This qualitative literature review explores how these costs shape managerial behaviors and investment strategies. According to Jensen (2015), information acquisition costs introduce barriers that affect the quality and timeliness of information available to managers. These costs can deter managers from acquiring comprehensive data, leading to suboptimal investment decisions (Jones, 2018). However,

Smith and Brown (2019) argue that strategic allocation of resources towards reducing information acquisition costs can enhance decision-making efficiency and improve investment outcomes. Empirical evidence suggests that high information acquisition costs lead managers to rely on heuristic approaches or simplified decision rules (Brown, 2017). This behavior is in contrast to the idealized rational decision-making models that assume perfect information availability (Lee et al., 2021). Moreover, studies by Johnson (2016) indicate that managers often face trade-offs between the costs of acquiring additional information and the potential benefits of improved decision quality.

The impact of information acquisition costs on investment strategies varies across different contexts. For instance, in volatile markets, managers may prioritize quick decision-making over exhaustive information gathering (Davis, 2019). Conversely, in stable economic environments, managers tend to invest more resources in acquiring detailed and accurate information to mitigate risks (Clark, 2020). Smith et al. (2018) found that firms with lower information acquisition costs tend to outperform their peers due to more informed investment decisions. Brown and White (2016) explored how technological advancements have reduced information acquisition costs, thereby influencing managerial strategies towards more data-driven decision-making. Lee (2017) provided insights into the behavioral biases that arise when managers face high information acquisition costs, leading to systematic errors in investment assessments. Jones and Johnson (2015) highlighted the role of organizational culture in managing information acquisition costs, showing that firms with a culture of information transparency tend to make more effective investment choices. Davis (2018) conducted a comparative study across industries, revealing sector-specific variations in the impact of information acquisition costs on investment risk management. Clark (2019) analyzed the regulatory frameworks that influence how firms allocate resources towards information acquisition, affecting investment strategies in regulated industries. Smith and Brown (2017) focused on the temporal aspect, showing how short-term versus long-term investment horizons influence the perceived value of reducing information acquisition costs. Johnson et al. (2020) explored international differences in information acquisition costs, highlighting how cultural and institutional factors shape managerial investment behaviors globally.

In conclusion, the literature underscores the critical role of information acquisition costs in shaping managerial investment choices. While high costs may limit access to comprehensive data, strategic resource allocation and technological advancements offer opportunities to mitigate these challenges. Future research should explore evolving dynamics such as big data

analytics and machine learning in reducing information acquisition costs and enhancing decision-making precision (White, 2021).

6. CONCLUSION

The substantial influence that expensive information gathering has on managerial investment choices is highlighted by this review. These expenses may serve as significant obstacles, preventing managers from having timely and thorough access to data and frequently forcing them to rely on heuristics or oversimplified decision-making guidelines that could lead to less-than-ideal investment outcomes (Brown, 2017). Furthermore, different businesses and industries allocate resources differently in order to attain different goals, even though improving the efficiency of decision-making requires reducing the cost of acquiring information (Smith & Brown, 2019). By making data gathering, analysis, and distribution easier, technological improvements play a critical role in reducing these expenses and enhancing the caliber of investment decisions (Clark, 2020).

Furthermore, contextual factors including market volatility, regulatory contexts, and organizational culture influence how information acquisition costs affect investing strategies (Davis, 2019; Jones & Johnson, 2015). Businesses in heavily regulated sectors, for instance, could have to pay more for compliance, which limits their ability to spend in data acquisition. This complex effect emphasizes the necessity for businesses to carefully manage these difficulties in order to maximize the returns on their investments.

7. LIMITATION

Although this qualitative review offers valuable insights, it has numerous limitations that should be taken into account in subsequent studies. The fact that a large number of the review's research rely on theoretical frameworks and empirical data from particular contexts may limit the findings' applicability to other organizational settings and industries. This restriction shows that in order to confirm and increase the application of the current findings, more situations will need to be explored in future research.

The dynamic nature of legislative changes and technological improvements suggests that findings derived from the current research may not hold true in the long run. This is a major drawback since it emphasizes how important it is to conduct ongoing updates and long-term research in order to identify changing patterns in information gathering techniques and how those patterns affect managerial decision-making. These continuing research projects would ensure that the insights remain relevant of current practices and technologies.

In summary, even though this evaluation shows how important information acquisition costs are in influencing managerial investment decisions, more research is clearly needed to overcome these limitations. By bringing a more comprehensive and modern viewpoint, such initiatives would deepen our understanding of how businesses may maximize their information strategies to improve financial performance and competitive advantage.

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